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Competition law is traditionally conceived as regulation of the marketplace to ensure private conduct does not suppress free trade and competition. It has as its goal the preservation of competition. Competition serves to optimize consumers' interests. Consumer protection regulation denotes a body of law designed to protect a consumer's interests at the level of the individual transaction. The two fields share the same ultimate goal of protecting consumers.
But their approaches to achieving that goal differ. It may be possible to conceive as the overriding distinction as one of market definition:
consumer protection regulation defines the market to be very small, limited to the parameters of the individual transaction.
That difference in approaches suggests it is possible that integration of a scheme designed to regulate markets nation-or world-wide with a scheme designed to regulate atomistic transactions, which consumer protection does, is neither realistic nor desirable.
Likewise, protecting consumers in individual transactions with a scheme designed to ensure competition is preserved may miss the mark. This paper explores those possibilities as well.
The integration of competition law and consumer protection has both substantive and systemic components. 4 The substantive question is whether pursuing the end of consumer welfare optimization through market regulation is consistent with pursuing the same end through regulating transactions. The systemic question is whether an agency or remedial scheme constituted to advance competition policy can also serve the purpose of protecting individual consumers or an agency or remedial scheme constituted to protect 4 See WE Kovacic, The Federal Trade Commission at 100: Into our 2nd Century (2009) 8 ("successful public policy outcomes are the product of good physics and good engineering", defining "physics" of competition and consumer protection to be doctrinal and policy questions, and "engineering" to be institutional questions), available at www.ftc.gov/ftc/workshops/ftc100/docs/ftc100rpt.pdf.
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individual consumers is consistent with the larger goal of preserving competition.
In Part II, I discuss the meaning of consumer harm. The prevention of consumer harm is a goal of both competition law and consumer protection.
What consumer harm means is remarkably under-theorized. In Part III, I address the following doctrinal and theoretical innovations and their place in the two fields. First is the common use of deception rationales in consumer protection and competition law enforcement. Second is the application of behavioral economics in both consumer protection and competition law enforcement. Third is market manipulation as a specific example of a hybrid competition/consumer protection theory. Fourth and last is monopoly exploitation as a specific example of a hybrid competition/consumer protection theory. I then turn in Part IV to the topic of enforcement systems. I inquire whether an agency created for competition law enforcement is appropriately situated to engage in consumer protection work. I also propose the possibility that private actions are better used in consumer protection than in competition law.
B. THE ELUSIVE CONCEPT OF "CONSUMER HARM"
There is seemingly universal worldwide agreement that competition law and consumer protection law both exist to protect consumers. 5 What is the harm to be prevented or remedied remains poorly understood. Consumer harm in competition law may differ from consumer harm in the field of consumer protection.
7 It is also necessary to ask what is meant by "consumer," and whether it is the same thing between competition and consumer protection law.
1.
Consumer Protection
In the consumer protection field, harm is comparatively easy to define. It is a break-down in an individual consumer transaction. The failure usually occurs at the origination stage. But as, for example, in the cases of laws regulating usury or common-law doctrines such as unconscionability, consumer harm can occur in the substance of the transaction. The failures with which consumer law is concerned undermine the consumer's ability to optimize his or her own welfare. Consumer law targets those failings to grant individual consumers remedies. It thus fills gaps that market forces leave unfilled.
In the US system, at least, the "consumer" in consumer protection law usually is easy to define: it is the individual, end-user consumer.
8
Many US federal consumer protection statutes limit their application to transactions involving individuals where the subject of the transaction is primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. Competition Law
Defining consumer harm is much more difficult in competition law. The consumer harm in US competition law generally is phrased in terms of decreased output and increased prices.
13
The dictum that competition law should be primarily concerned with consumer welfare is more fully understood to mean competition law seeks to prevent harm to competition, and consumer welfare will be thereby maximized. 14 10 OFT, supra n 2, ¶ 2.4; see also ibid. ¶ 2.3 (defining "consumer" as "individual retail consumer").
11
See 15 U.S.C. § 45.
12
See, e.g., Charles of the Ritz Distrib. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1944 ) (FTC Act "not made for the protection of experts, but for the public," including "the average woman, conditioned by talk in magazines and over the radio"). It is also the case that consumer protection is a populist endeavor, and protecting individual end-users makes for a better press release than does protecting a commercial enterprise. Such an approach has the tendency to undermine any direct intervention on behalf of individual consumers. If an individual transaction produces a sub-optimal result, competition law assumes the marketplace will supply the resolution.
15
The incapable or shady merchant will be replaced by one who serves consumers' wishes and does so fairly. Across the mass of consumers, then, welfare may be optimized. The handful of consumers left unsatisfied before the losing producer exited the market are too few to bring down the average. Those few do not reflect "harm to competition." 16 The definition of "consumer antitrust" remains undertheorized.
17
That is a remarkable reality, given the frequency with which consumer welfare is invoked to justify a particular decision or policy prescription.
18 There remains a vigorous debate whether consumers benefit when economic efficiency is maximized, and who gets the surplus is unimportant, or competition law requires that merger for the proposition that an emphasis on consumer protection risks over-enforcement). 15 OFT, supra n 2, ¶ 2.3.
16
Professor Crane differentiates between wealth transfers from individual consumers to producers, which is "not necessarily inefficient in an economic sense," and "deadweight losses" which are "the primary social costs of anticompetitive behavior. Averitt and Lande's "consumer choice" paradigm harmonizes competition law and consumer protection. Competition law, by protecting competition, ensures consumers have options available to them. Consumer protection ensures that "consumers are able to make a reasonably free and rational selection from among those options."
20 That elegant resolution suggests that antitrust and consumer protection are complementary so long as consumer protection targets the origination phase of the consumer transaction, dealing with theories of deception and their close cousin, disclosure regulation. Averitt's and Lande's paradigm does not hold where consumer protection regulation targets substantive transaction terms, because those terms limit, rather than enhance, consumer choice.
C. DOCTRINAL AND THEORETICAL INNOVATIONS
In this Part I discuss four legal innovations and their place in antitrust and consumer protection, respectively. First is the common use of deception rationales in consumer protection and competition law enforcement. Second is the application of behavioral economics in both consumer protection and competition law enforcement. Third is market manipulation as a specific example of a
19
The "surplus" is the area on the supply-demand graph that reflects amounts consumers are willing to pay in excess of the producer's costs of production. See KN Hylton, Antitrust Law: Economic Theory and Common Law Evolution (2003), 3-4 (noting that "total surplus" is the aggregate of the differences between what consumers are willing to pay and producers are willing to accept for each unit of output). Much business conduct can be explained by producers' efforts to coopt for themselves as much of the surplus as possible.
20
Averitt & Lande, supra n 17, at 181. Cf. OFT, supra n 2, ¶ 3.3 (OFT's interventions "safeguard the choices available to customers." Consumer protection "promot[es] 'clean' conditions in which customers can exercise choice . . . .").
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Deception
Deception is the quintessential consumer harm.
21
Deception operates at the origination phase of a consumer transaction. It limits consumers' abilities fully and fairly to negotiate the terms of the transaction and causes them to enter into transactions they would otherwise eschew. Deception thus strikes at the foundation of the freedom of contract and welfare optimization through free choice. Harm exists even where the transaction is otherwise "fair" to the consumer.
According to Professor Stucke, circumstances may exist in which deception also is competitive harm.
22
He argues that profit-maximizing firms would only engage in deception if the expected benefits, in the form of monopoly profits, outweighed the expected costs, which include the costs of the deceitful advertising, the criminal and civil liability that may attend, and the "potential loss of sales, goodwill, and competitive advantage if the deceit is uncovered". Stucke, ibid., at 13. In support of Stucke's arguments, the concerns of loss of sales, goodwill and competitive advantage seem small in comparison to the advantages to be gained from fraud and deceit. Importantly, the benefit from deceit is borne entirely by the single deceitful actor. The harm is spread across the entire industry. Cf. Kovacic, supra n 1, at 114-15 ("False advertising and deceptive marketing practices can damage the capacity of honest merchants to attract consumers . . . .").
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24
It is not difficult to see how, in theory, deception can harm the marketplace as well as the individual consumer. Market forces operate on the basis of consumers' revealed preferences. Where consumer decisions are made on the basis of material misinformation, consumer contracting decisions do not reveal consumer preferences in any real sense. The very harm that gives rise to liability under consumer protection theories also presents a possible competitive concern.
Moreover, economists have proved that deception will exist in some optimal amount whenever one of two conditions holds. Either there must be a strong belief that the deception will not be exposed, or the firm must not be concerned about repeat business.
25
A monopoly or near-monopoly marketplace satisfies both conditions. Consumers have no alternatives, so must return to the monopoly producer if they want to make a purchase. And the chance of deception being exposed is minimized because there are no competitors available to do the exposing.
26
That suggests that monopoly maintenance 24 Stucke, supra n 21, at 42. Stucke argues that deception cannot succeed in a perfectly competitive marketplace. Stucke, supra n 21, at 2 ("Deception does not occur in a perfectly competitive market . . . ."). Darby and Karni demonstrate otherwise. Producers in a perfectly competitive market are indifferent as to whether the consumer returns, satisfying one of the conditions for some amount of fraud being optimal. See Darby & Karni, supra n 24, at 77 ("In the strictest competitive framework for the model, the present value of future relationship with the customer would be zero, since there is no reason for the customer to return in the future in any case."). Cf.OFT, supra n 2, ¶ 2.4 ("consumer policy issues may arise in industries that seem highly competitive, such as house repairs and airlines"); E Deception might also present a theory of harm in oligopoly industries. Firms in an industry marked by few participants and with homogenous goods (or homogeneous characteristics of differentiated goods) might find it advantageous not to expose their competitors' deception, but instead to imitate it. 27 A ready example of this is the parallel failure of cigarette manufacturers to expose the harm caused by rivals' products.
28
Jurisdictions that pursue theories of harm through tacit collusion might consider tacitly collusive deception as a form of illegal coordinated conduct.
Tacitly collusive deception is certainly not, or likely to become, a theory of harm in the US system. Janger and Block-Lieb give the example of two "lemons equilibria" in consumer lending, where, despite competition, lenders engage in "price concealment" and the enforcing of "default rates, late fees and penalties" that are "both non-transparent and designed to capitalize on consumer heuristic biases." Janger & Block-Lieb, supra n 26, draft at 4.
29
The US Supreme Court reaffirmed US courts' resolve to prohibit tacit collusion as an enforcement theory in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007 It held a conference on behavioral economics and consumer policy in 2007. 38 At that conference, papers demonstrating consumer decision-making biases and merchants' abilities to exploit those biases were presented and critiqued.
39
The agency currently is undertaking "two exploratory studies on consumer susceptibility to fraudulent and deceptive marketing."
40
The studies will concentrate on "several decision-making biases . . . that can cause inaccurate assessments of the risks, costs, and benefits of various choices."
41
As of now, however, how exactly to incorporate behavioralist principles into a coherent enforcement regime remains under-studied.
Although the Federal Trade Commission has begun to study the theories, it has not so far articulated an Overtones of behavioralist theories can be found in semi-subjective standards for deception, based on the "reasonable consumer" test (which implies a lack of sophistication) 43 or in especially protective legislation targeted at college students.
44
Disclosure requirements also may be predicated on concerns for exploitation. For example, regulations requiring that warnings be highlighted or be particularly vivid 45 might be linked to known tendencies to consumer optimism or seek themselves to exploit the so-called "vividness" bias.
The Federal Trade Commission's consumer education efforts may also be explained in part by a desire to overcome consumers' decision-making biases in individual transactions.
By contrast, behavioralist theories are slow to catch on in the analysis of competition law. See, e.g., Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. § § 1331-1341 (stating disclosure requirements for cigarette manufacturers). 46 It may be possible to conceive of all conduct presenting competitive harms as deceptive or behaviorally exploitative in nature. The definition of most abusive dominant firm conduct assumes net consumer harm over the period of anticompetitive conduct and subsequent recoupment. Repeat player consumers acting rationally would not make purchasing decisions that would cause them greater expense over the long run. If consumers do act rationally, purchasing decisions that cause them net harm can be explained either by their being deceived or by information asymmetries that reflect omissions (deceptive under certain circumstances) by the producers. Consumers acting irrationally, based perhaps on optimism about future events or hyperbolic discounting of future costs, can be led into purchasing decisions that are more costly in the long term. The demand-side question is a different matter. Behavioral economics teaches that consumers are not always rational. The Office of Fair Trading recently has recognized that remedies may be crafted with an eye toward realities of consumer behavior imported from the study of consumer protection.
For example, while consumer choice is believed to be good, behavioral economics teaches too much choice leads to sub-optimal results.
50
In Money, is that What I Want?, Stucke questions the assumptions of rational choice on the part of consumers.
51
He stops short of prescribing a theory of competitive harm based on "behavioral exploitation" -which I define to be a merchant's exploiting known biases in consumer decisionmaking. A theory of competitive harm through behavioral exploitation might approximate the theory of competitive harm through deception discussed in sub-part A, above. By exploiting known biases in consumer decision-making, a monopolist can maintain, or perhaps even attain, monopoly power, just as it does through deceptive 49 550 U. S. 544 (2007) . Cf. A Tor, The Fable of Entry: Bounded Ratinality, Market Discipline and Legal Policy (2002) , 101 Mich. L. Rev. 482 (concluding that behavioral economics teaches the traditional understanding of firms' entry decisions is wrong).
50
Office of Fair Trading, supra n.2, ¶ 3.9. See also Remarks of Cavendish Elithorn at the Fourth Antitrust Marathon, Tr. 14 (Oct. 27, 2009) (" So we [the OFT] do believe behavioural economics is a really important lens to look through this question and that has an impact on things like the choice question so we do believe in PQRS, price, quality, range and service as part of the overall welfare in our merger decisions and in our general approach but excessive choice can lead to less consumer activation in the markets and that is a source of detriment.") In concrete terms, behavioral exploitation includes such behavior as structuring default choices to induce consumers to make decisions favoring the merchant, not the consumer.
52
Other biases that can be exploited by savvy merchants include over-optimism; 53 the tendency to judge choices by their relative, rather than absolute, merit; 54 the tendency to believe exciting or fearsome (salient) phenomena, which are easy to call to mind, are more common than actually they are; 55 and the tendency to anchor decisions to arbitrary values.
56
A good recent example of behavioral exploitation in the US economy is the sale of lending products to consumers in the years leading up to the collapse of the housing bubble.
57
Consumers' agreeing to teaser-rate mortgages can be explained by decision-making biases such as irrational tendencies to over-optimism, 58 which would cause borrowers to believe they will be able to pay the mortgage or sell the house once the rate adjusts. In another paper discussed at the Fourth Antitrust Marathon, Professors Janger and Block-Lieb explain the phenomenon in terms of "cognitive limitations," "heuristic 52 It is exceedingly difficult to draw the line between vigorous and desireable marketing practices and "behavioral exploitation." How behavioral exploitation presents a competitive, rather than merely a consumer, harm is more difficult to explain. The behavioral exploitation theory of abuse of dominance suffers the same difficulties as does the deception theory. It is difficult to demonstrate the competitive harm, rather than harm to one consumer, flowing from a course of behavioral exploitation. But the same rationale supporting deception as a competitive harm should apply to behavioral exploitation, perhaps even with more force. The market impacts of falsely revealed preferences must produce allocative inefficiencies as resources flow to uses that reflect consumers' apparent, rather than actual, preferences. Unlike deception, behavioral exploitation is difficult to uncover, and therefore may produce longer-lasting consumer harm.
60
Thus, as with deception, two criteria for some amount of behavioral exploitation being rational are a lack of expectation of repeat player business and a low risk of detection.
61
A monopoly marketplace satisfies both criteria, with no competitors to expose the behavioral exploitation and no other options available to consumers. Monopoly maintenance through behavioral exploitation seems likely to be successful. Acquiring a monopoly 59 Janger & Block-Lieb, supra n 26, __ [draft at 3].
60
Economist Pat Massey noted another concern with a behavioral exploitation theory of enforcement. " [W] e know from the economics of regulatory agencies they have an inbuilt incentive to continuously expand their activities so if you start down the road of saying we have to protect consumers from themselves agencies will find great scope to dream up all sorts of imaginative ways of doing that and expanding your own empires." Remarks at the Fourth Antitrust Marathon 45-46 (Oct. 27, 2009 Market manipulation as a theory of competitive harm is sufficiently unique in the US system that this approach required the first antitrust rulemaking in US history. The description of the rule and its purposes reads much more like classic consumer protection doctrine. The FTC is concerned with "fraud," "deceit," and "omissions of material information." Monopoly acquisition has recently been argued to be an enforcement backwater both in the US, where it technically can be challenged, and in the EU, where "a nondominant firm may obtain dominance through unilateral anticompetitive conduct without risking violating European competition law." A Tor, Unilateral, Anticompetitive Acquisitions of Dominance or Monopoly Power (2010) , Draft at 2-3, available at ssrn.com/abstract=1531745.
63
Competitors will be educated in the same marketing techniques and will be able to recognize exploitative conduct engaged in by their competition. 64 
."). The Compliance
Guide also differentiates between conduct in bilateral negotiations, which are "unlikely to affect the integrity of the market," and "widely disseminated" false statements or omissions, which have market-wide consequences. The former are not intended to be covered by the prohibition on manipulation, while the latter are. See id. at 3, 10.
68
See OFT, supra n 2, ¶ 2.3 (differentiating "individual retail consumers" from "large players, both upstream and downstream"). Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951) (holding horizontal maximum price fixing to be per se illegal; holding has been supported because the maximum price fixing has the capacity to preclude competitive entry).
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Harm to consumers can occur where prices are pegged to a benchmark and the manipulation serves to impact that benchmark in the seller's favor.
71
But because the rule operates in the wholesale marketplace, some form of pass-through would be required to produce an effect on individual end-user consumers.
Monopoly Exploitation
The US system has traditionally viewed abuse of properly acquired monopoly power as not presenting a competition law concern, 72 although it may implicate consumer protection issues if it violates a particular prohibition. 73 For example, some US states prohibit "price gouging," defined (under one representative law) as selling or leasing essential commodities or shelter at an excessive mark-up over the average price prior to the emergency. 74 The EC has announced that such "directly exploitative" conduct may infringe Article 82, prompting Commission intervention "in particular where the protection of consumers and the proper functioning of the internal market cannot otherwise be adequately assured." The proper role of exploitative abuse enforcement in a competition law scheme is unclear. Correcting for abuses permitted by asymmetries in bargaining power favoring producers is a natural extension of contract law "overreaching" doctrines, such as duress and unconscionability, and as such may be properly the 75 Draft Updates, supra n.7, at i (Executive Summary). See also M Aitken, Remarks at the Fourth Antitrust Marathon, Tr. 22 (Oct. 27, 2009 subject of a consumer protection framework. However, such abuses can be invitations to competitive entry. Correcting for those abuses may entrench the power of a monopolist, rather than increase competition.
79
And Commissioner Kovacic has suggested that "controls on abusive behavior by dominant enterprises" may "inevitably become mechanisms by which frail and politically buffeted competition agencies reestablish the type of state orchestration of the economy that market reforms were designed to eliminate."
D. ENFORCEMENT SYSTEMS
The systemic question is whether an agency constituted to advance competition policy can also serve the purpose of protecting individual consumers. It is possible consumer protection enforcement is best placed in the hands of private litigants. It is logical to question whether public enforcement of consumer protection laws, or consumer-protection-like behavioral exploitation, market manipulation or monopoly exploitation claims under a competition framework fails the test of comparative advantage. Such enforcement may rely on the particulars of individual consumers' circumstances in a way that favors private enforcement over public. By contrast, some have questioned the capacity of private litigants to remedy harms felt across the marketplace, rather than in individual transactions.
Agency Structure 79
It is all the more a concern that the monopolist whose power is entrenched has proved itself to be an unlikable character. 80 Kovacic, Competition Policy, supra n.1, at 103. Cf. Remarks of Bill Prasifka at the Fourth Antitrust Marathon, Tr. 31 (Oct. 27, 2009) (noting concerns for regulatory capture in consumer protection enforcement).
